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We wish to begin by thanking Constitutional Commentary 
for publishing these three thoughtful reviews of our book, 
Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues. The essays 
by Abner Greene, Ken Kersch, and Toni Massaro 1 reflect a rich 
and illuminating range of perspectives on our project. We will 
respond briefly to each. 
I. TONI M. MASSARO, SOME REALISM ABOUT 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERALISM 
We are grateful to Toni Massaro for her careful and 
sympathetic reading of our book. It is encouraging that she 
believes that Ordered Liberty contributes to making sense of 
contemporary rights practice- and liberal democracy- in the 
United States. We concur with her that the November 2012 
election provides a useful opportunity, both before the election, 
when she wrote her review, and after, as we write this response, 
to reflect on "the national mood" with respect to the evident 
competing visions of government "as ally" versus government 
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** Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University 
School of Law. Thanks to Courtney Gesualdi for help with this essay. 
1. Abner S. Greene, State Speech and Political Liberalism, 28 CONST. COMM. 421 
(2013); Ken I. Kersch, Bringing It All Back Home?, 28 CONST. COMM. 407 (2013); Toni 
M. Massaro, Some Realism About Constitutional Liberalism, 28 CONST. COMM. 383 
(2013). 
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"as antagonist. "2 She helpfully relates these clashes at the level 
of political campaigns to the broader debates over constitutional 
law and political theory that we address. M:oreover, it is 
especially encouraging that she concludes that the book has 
something useful to say to "the various patriot armies marching 
under American constitutional banners. "3 Indeed, this assess-
ment contrasts sharply with that of Ken Kersch, who faults us for 
situating our book-including its title-"at a stratospheric level 
of abstraction," oblivious to the practical battles of 
contemporary social and political movements taking place on the 
ground below.4 
Massaro grasps that claims about the Constitution and 
about the best balance between rights and responsibilities, 
governmental authority and individual liberty, liberty and 
equality, and so forth, are at issue in many of these movements. 
Again, a contrast with Kersch's review is instructive. While he 
views our project as straining to produce a "new liberalism" 
relevant to America;~ Massaro perceives that "the scope and 
content of constitutional liberalism are very much at issue" in 
contemporary national debates about "the proper reach of 
government authority."() She indicates that Ordered Liberty can 
provide " [ m ]ore realism about our constitutional liberalism. "7 
She argues that our book shows "the complexities and paradoxes 
of our constitutional law as it is" at a time when "a growing 
number of people" argue for "tectonic changes" in it and "some 
even favor a second constitutional convention. ,s We consider 
our time on the book well spent if a thoughtful scholar like 
Massaro draws this conclusion, given her own substantial 
contributions to making sense of some of the constitutional 
controversies we take on in Ordered Liberty. 
In that regard, we especially appreciate her image of a 
"liberty spectrum" as a way to characterize what we describe as 
thin versus thick justifications for rights, and her observation 
that constitutional rights can migrate from one end of the 
spectrum to the other over time.9 She offers the example of the 
evolving level of constitutional protection for gay men and 
2. Massaro, supra note 1, at 383. 
3. /d. at 406. 
4. Kersch, supra note 1, at 409. 
5. /d. at 419. 
6. Massaro, supra note 1, at 385. 
7. /d. at 404. 
8. /d. at 403 (emphasis in original). 
9. /d. at 397-400. 
2013] RESPONSE TO THREE VIEWS 437 
lesbians, from decriminalizing sodomy on a toleration rationale 
to allowing same-sex couples to marry (a move, we suggest, 
entailing appeals both to rights and to moral goods (pp. 177-
206) ). Her point that "constitutional liberalism in practice is both 
thick and thin" 10 is one missed by Kersch, who views our 
approach to rights justification as moving immediately to full 
respect and appreciation and leaving out steps along the way.'' It 
does not. 
Massaro praises us for clearing up many "false dichotomies" 
about constitutional liberalism and the relationships among 
rights, responsibilities, and virtues. However, she comments that 
we introduce a false dichotomy of our own- that between 
responsibility as autonomy and responsibility as accountability.' 2 
She makes some cogent points here (for example, "one parent's 
liberal-inspired civic education may be another's illiberal 
inculcation of secular humanism"). She contends: "There is no 
such thing as neutral government education, or a neutral 
formative project. " 13 This is a fair point. But we do not argue for 
neutrality in the sense of a value-free formative project or a 
government that is completely neutral about which ends it 
should promote. To be sure, some people will reject govern-
ment's ends as an "orthodoxy" contrary to their basic values. We 
used the autonomy/accountability point to stress the importance 
of a realm of personal self-government. When we said that the 
two were related, we meant to get at the authority of 
government to engage in a formative project and also to try to 
persuade or promote its own ends. Further, we meant to 
acknowledge that, in a regime that protects rights to self-
government, there is ample room for non-governmental actors-
be they individual citizens or social movements-to voice views 
about rights and their responsible exercise. (pp. 40-45) We 
concur with Massaro (as well as with Abner Greene, discussed 
below) that a critical distinction between these two forms of 
responsibility is that between coercion and persuasion. As 
Massaro observes, "responsibility as autonomy more emphati-
cally focuses attention on the liberal concern about coercion."14 
10. /d. at 397. 
11. Kersch, supra note 1, at 414-15. 
12. Massaro, supra note 1, at 400-01. 
13. /d. at 401. 
14. /d. 
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II. KEN I. KERSCH, BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME? 
Kersch titles his essay "Bringing It All Bac:k Home"? As 
Bob Dylan fans who love his album of that name, we take the 
title as a compliment, even if Kersch did not exactly intend it as 
such. It is an unwitting compliment in that, even while Kersch 
faults our book for supposedly being pitched, like the work of 
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, at "a stratospheric level of 
abstraction," 15 he credits us with bringing our analysis back home 
to the American constitutional order. What is more, even as he 
criticizes our book for aiming at timeless abstractions, he 
acknowledges "'the book's ... substantive timeliness" and its 
"perfect harmony with the moment."16 We daresay that only 
someone with a strong allergic reaction to the very mention of 
Rawls and Dworkin would fault our book for a "stratospheric 
level of abstraction." We appreciate Massaro's praise for the 
concreteness of our engagement with the cases protecting basic 
liberties, our understanding of the social movements supporting 
(and opposing) recognition of these liberties, and our 
justifications for the basic liberties in the context of our present 
predicaments. 
Further developing his thought about timeliness, Kersch 
suggests that the publication of our book dernonstrates that 
"[y]et another Owl [of Minerva], it seems, has taken flight." 17 We 
take his allusion to Hegel's Owl of Minerva with reference to 
our book as another unintended compliment. For, in Hegel's 
formulation, the owl has wisdom in understanding an historical 
era that has just come to a close. But his allusion is incomplete, 
for he does not establish that the era we show wisdom in 
understanding has come to a close rather than perhaps faces a 
bright future. For the allusion to have genuine purchase here, 
the Supreme Court would have to overrule or cut back on 
Lawrence v. Texas 18 or Planned Parenthood v. Case/ 9 or the 
whole line of cases protecting basic liberties under the Due 
Process Clause just as we published our book's full and coherent 
justification of them-just as our form of civic liberalism had 
"gotten right with America" and brought the comrnunitarian and 
conservative critics of liberalism "up-to-date, and show[ ed] them 
15. Kersch, supra note 1, at 409. 
16. /d. at 414,419. 
17. /d. at 410. 
18. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
19. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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up. "20 Such changes hardly seem imminent, though we concede 
that Kersch could prove to be a seer. 
In response to Kersch's criticisms, we shall make several 
clarifications of our project, namely: (1) the character of our 
synthesis of liberalism and republicanism; (2) our understanding 
of "ordered liberty" in relation to Justice Cardozo's; (3) our 
invocation of Justice Harlan's idea of the "rational continuum" 
of ordered liberty; and ( 4) our reasons for focusing on the Due 
Process Clause as a battleground concerning rights, 
responsibilities, and virtues. 
A. OUR "GRAND THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS" OF LIBERALISM 
AND REPUBLICANISM 
We appreciate Kersch's acknowledgment of the ambition of 
our project-that it aims at "grand theoretical synthesis" of 
liberalism with civic republicanism and communitarianism (and, 
we would add, feminism). 21 But we disavow any aim ''to bring 
the liberal-communitarian debate to a close." To the contrary, 
we seek to advance this debate constructively, with the full 
expectation that it will prove enduring or, as he puts it, 
"perpetual. "22 We are baffled by his statement that " [a ]mongst 
American historians, that debate, under the guise of liberalism 
vs. republicanism, was brought (more or less) to a close some 
time ago." He suggests that scholarship in constitutional theory 
like ours has lagged behind.23 With all due respect, the debate 
among American historians about liberalism versus republican-
ism to which Kersch refers was a very different debate from that 
in which we are engaged in our book. That was a debate 
between Louis Hartz on the one hand and Gordon Wood and 
J.G.A. Pocock on the other hand.24 That debate centered on the 
clash between liberalism and republicanism in the founding of 
the American constitutional order. 
We do not enter into that debate. We focus on a different 
one: how best to justify constitutional rights-in particular, basic 
liberties under the Due Process Clause- in the here and now. 
20. Kersch, supra note 1, at 410, 419. 
21. /d. at 409. 
22. /d. at 410. 
23. /d. at 409. 
24. LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); J.G.A. POCOCK, 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 (1969). 
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Michael Sandel's civic republican and Cass Sunstein's minimalist 
republican criticisms of liberal justifications for the right of 
privacy post-1986-when the Supreme Court decided Bowers v. 
Hardwick25 - not the republican versus liberal understanding of 
the founding in 1787, are the concerns of our synthesis. 
Autonomy versus moral goods (pp. 177-206) and minimalism 
versus perfectionism (pp. 207-35) as grounds for justifying basic 
liberties are our concerns, not Locke versus 1V1achiavelli in 
relation to the American founding. As far as we know, 
American historians have hardly begun to consider the former 
debate, if at all, though they did exhaustively engage with the 
latter debate about twenty-five years ago.26 
B. OUR ASPIRATION TO "ORDERED LIBERTY" 
Kersch criticizes our invocation of the concept of "ordered 
liberty" along with that of "autonomy." After criticizing the 
"characteristic abstractions of this literature," he asks: "And 
since when has a commitment to 'dignity,' 'autonomy,' 'equal 
concern and respect,' or 'the con1mon good' ever decided a 
concrete case as a logical deduction from principle?"27 And he 
asks, skeptically, "how much work can the concept [of ordered 
liberty] actually do?"2x Thus, he seems to suggest that our 
arguments for basic liberties proceed "as a logical deduction" 
from the principle of ordered liberty or autonomy. 
We fear that Kersch has misunderstood our argument. First, 
we do not present constitutional interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause as a matter of making logical deduction from 
abstract principles. To the contrary, we present it largely as a 
matter of common law interpretation, developing a line of cases 
protecting basic liberties through reasoning by analogy from one 
case to the next and, over time, elaborating the principles and 
frameworks that best fit and justify the cases. (pp .. 237-72) That 
is, we work up an account of and justification for the line of cases 
already decided, concretely. We present the cases as manifesting 
a concern to secure the basic liberties that are preconditions for 
deliberative autonomy.29 We do not begin with abstract 
25. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
26. See, e.g.. Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
27. Kersch. supra note I. at 412. 
28. /d. 
29. For fuller elaboration of the idea of "deliberative autonomy," see JAMES E. 
FLEMING. SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 89-
111 (2006). 
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principles of deliberative autonomy and ordered liberty and 
make logical deductions from them to decide cases. Here we 
surmise that Kersch's aversion to anything Rawlsian or 
Dworkinian may have clouded his reading. 
Kersch characterizes "ordered liberty" as Justice Cardozo's 
phrase in Palko v. Connecticut (1937).30 He criticizes our account 
because we "don't set the context" for Cardozo's usage of the 
concept of "ordered liberty," namely, that of distinguishing (1) 
those provisions of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental and 
therefore "incorporated" by the Fourteenth Amendment and 
made applicable to the states, and (2) those which are not.31 
We do not set the context for Cardozo's usage of ordered 
liberty because we are not using his conception of ordered 
liberty. As a matter of fact, we reject Cardozo's conception. For 
one thing, we agree with Justice Black as against Justice Cardozo 
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, not just selectively incorporates 
some of them. 32 For another, we emphatically reject Cardozo's 
conclusion in Palko itself that freedom from double jeopardy is 
not a basic liberty protected against state infringement. 
More generally, we would insist that the phrase ''ordered 
liberty" is nobody's property. It is a phrase in common usage in 
political and constitutional discourse. In Palko, Cardozo used 
the term in the context of "selective incorporation" of certain 
rights enumerated in the provisions of the Bill of Rights through 
the Due Process Clause. In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun used 
the term in the context of deciding what rights that are not 
enumerated in the provisions of the Bill of Rights are 
nonetheless protected by the Due Process Clause.33 In Rights 
Talk, Mary Ann Glendon used the term "ordered liberty," 
mentioning Cardozo and other sources, to express an aspiration 
of communitarians in contrast with what she depicted as liberals' 
pursuit of "liberty as license. "34 In developing a civic liberalism, 
we sought to reclaim the concept of ordered liberty from 
conservatives like Glendon who in recent years have claimed a 
monopoly on it. And we propounded ordered liberty as 
30. Kersch, supra note 1, at 412 (discussing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 
(1937)). 
31. !d. at 417. 
32. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
33. 410 u.s. 113. 152-54 (1973). 
34. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 10. 14 (1991). 
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encapsulating one of the ends of our constitutional order 
proclaimed in the Preamble to the Constitution and one of the 
aspirations of our framework for ordering rights, responsibilities, 
and virtues. To respond directly to Kersch's challenge, that is the 
"work" that ordered liberty actually does in our project, not 
"logical deduction from principle."35 
C. OUR INVOCATION OF JUSTICE HARLAN'S IDEA OF THE 
"RATIONAL CONTINUUM" 
Finally, after characterizing the conservative Justice Harlan 
as our "hero," Kersch charges us with selective invocation of 
Harlan's constitutional jurisprudence.36 More generally, he 
criticizes our book for its "selection bias" (to which we return 
below). He charges that we analyze "a subset of constitutional 
cases whose selection is both theoretically and historically 
skewed to support [our] thesis," further charging that " [ t ]hese 
cases do not effectively speak to the full universe of civil liberties 
concerns."
37 We set out to write a book that would focus on 
demonstrating the ordering of rights, responsibilities, and virtues 
in cases protecting substantive basic liberties (or not) under the 
Due Process Clause. Hence, we are puzzled by the criticism that 
we did not undertake to examine "the full universe of civil 
liberties concerns." Indeed we did not. 
Let us make clear that in our explication of "the myth of 
strict scrutiny for fundamental rights" under the Due Process 
Clause in Chapter 9 of our book-when we invoke Harlan's idea 
of the "rational continuum" of liberty and judg1nent from his 
dissent in Poe v. Ullman 3R as against the idea of absolutist, rigidly 
maintained tiers of scrutiny-we are not embracing Harlan as 
our "hero" any more than we are the authors of the joint opinion 
in Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. We are 
claiming only that in Poe and Casey, these justices propound a 
better understanding of the "rational continuum" of liberty and 
judgment- as they have operated in the American constitutional 
practice of interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect 
substantive liberties from Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) to the 
present- than do originalist critics of substantive liberties like 
Justice Scalia and communitarian critics of "rights talk" like 
35. Kersch, supra note 1, at 412. 
36. !d. at 416, 41H-19. 
37. /d. at 419. 
38. 367 U.S. 497.542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Glendon. (pp. 237-72) Making this claim in no way commits us 
to embracing Harlan's constitutional jurisprudence as a whole. 
Truth be told, if there is a "hero" in our analysis of the Due 
Process Clause, it is Justice Stevens. We praise his famous 
critique of the framework of strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clausel embracing his argument for a "continuum of 
judgmental responses" instead of a framework of absolutist, 
rigidly maintained tiers of scrutiny. (p. 240) We model our 
criticism of the framework of strict scrutiny under the Due 
Process Clause on his critique, demonstrating an analogous 
"continuum of judgmental responses." (pp. 240-41) 
Finally, our exposing the "myth of strict scrutiny for 
fundamental rights" under the Due Process Clause, contrary to 
Kersch's suggestion, is not inconsistent with treating the basic 
liberties protected under that clause as "preferred freedoms." 
We are not throwing the baby out with the bathwater.39 We 
argue that our constitutional practice has protected basic 
liberties under the Due Process Clause "stringently"- thus 
according them a "preferred position"- not absolutely, as they 
would be under the mythical framework of strict scrutiny. (pp. 
237-72) 
D. OUR REASONS FOR FOCUSING ON THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE 
We want to close by responding to Kersch's more general 
criticism of our account of "ordered liberty" for its ''selection 
bias."40 We have written a book focusing on cases protecting 
substantive basic liberties (or not) under the Due Process Clause 
rather than a book more broadly covering "the full universe of 
civil liberties concerns. "41 He evidently concedes that the cases 
protecting rights under the Due Process Clause are "ripe for re-
description as implicating serious questions of the public good, 
responsibility, citizenship, and virtue."42 
But, Kersch argues, "the problem" is that these types of 
cases are "only a small part of 'rights revolution' cases that 
conservatives and communitarians criticize for being overly 
solicitous of claims anchored in arguments about autonomy." He 
continues: "Where, I wondered, was the discussion of the claims 
39. Kersch, supra note 1, at 418. 
40. !d. at 412, 414. 
41. !d. at 419. 
42. !d. at 414. 
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of autonomy in cases involving, say, a jacket that says 'Fuck the 
Draft,' flag-burning, nude-dancing, the possession of porno-
graphic films, cross-burning, hateful disruptive protests at 
military funerals, the banning of violent video games, the 
aggressive defense of criminal process rights, including 
aggressive assertions of the Fifth Amendment in cases involving 
charges of domestic subversion, etc. ?"4l 
To the charge of "selection bias," we have three responses. 
One, our decision to write a book focusing on cases protecting 
substantive basic liberties (or not) under the Due Process Clause 
rather than taking up all of the claims he mentions is eminently 
defensible on the ground that these cases raise the "culture war" 
issues that divide liberals from communitarians like Glendon 
and civic republicans like Sandel. These cases have constituted 
the most contested battleground concerning rights, responsi-
bilities, and virtues in recent years. 
Two, we would observe that, remarkably, at the present 
time, on most of the First Amendment issues he mentions, 
liberals and conservatives have united in support of a neutral, 
absolutist First Amendment (though we reject it). We observed 
this development in Chapter 2 of our book, noting that many 
communitarians who call for encouraging responsibilities and 
inculcating virtues where Due Process liberties are concerned 
have embraced the neutral, absolutist First Arnendment and 
rejected restrictions upon many of the types of speech that 
Kersch lists. (pp. 37-39) Moreover, we specifically discussed the 
military funeral protest case. Far from being "skittish" about 
"those types of issues, ''44 we criticized the conservative Roberts 
Court for its absolutist First Amendment jurisprudence that 
rejected the claims of community and harm. We expressed our 
agreement with Justice Alito's dissent (and with retired Justice 
Stevens's criticism) arguing that the case was wrongly decided. 
(pp. 38-39) 
And three, writing a book that aimed to analyze rights, 
responsibilities, and virtues across all of constitutional law not 
only would have been too unwieldy and too abstract, but also 
probably would have been incoherent. We do not claim that 
there is an aspiration to ordered liberty that embraces the "full 
universe of civil liberties concerns." Our concern in the book is 
with articulating "the most defensible ordering of rights, 
43. /d. 
44. !d .. 
2013] RESPONSE TO THREE VIEWS 445 
responsibilities, and virtues in the American constitutional 
order" as far as substantive basic liberties protected (or not) 
under the Due Process Clause are concerned. (p. 3) That project 
is ambitious enough and in any case is eminently defensible. 
III. ABNER S. GREENE, STATE SPEECH AND 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
If Toni Massaro assesses our project from the standpoint of 
a sympathetic civic liberalism, Abner Greene criticizes it from 
the standpoint of a fellow political liberal traveler. Over the 
years, both of us have benefitted from engaging with Greene-in 
person and in print-about various dilemmas posed by 
pluralism, governmental speech, and a constitutional order 
premised on, as he aptly calls it in the subtitle of his own recent 
book, "multiple sources of authority."4) For example, his work 
has informed our own analysis of the tensions within our 
constitutional order concerning the relationship between 
government and civil society-whether the latter, as seedbeds of 
civic virtue, is congruent with and undergirds the political order, 
or instead functions as sources of norms and values distinct from 
those and as a buffer against governmental power. (pp. 146-47) 
In addition, we agree with Greene that government may use 
methods short of coercion to persuade about public values and 
constitutional principles. 
However, Greene also maintains that government is "just 
one repository" of the people's power among others and must 
compete, after all, for the people's allegiance.411 By contrast, we 
believe that the status of citizen and the ideal of free and equal 
citizenship-and the norms attendant to being a citizen-are 
weighty and not simply one contender in the marketplace for 
allegiance. We also argue that, in addition to using its persuasive 
power, government n1ay use tools like antidiscrimination laws to 
promote free and equal citizenship. These laws are not simply 
persuasive, in expressing ideals, but also harness the state's 
coercive power by commanding people and institutions that they 
may not act in certain ways-and must act in certain ways (that 
is, provide goods and services in a nondiscriminatory 1natter). 
This, of course, raises the question of the permissible scope of 
exemption from such laws when the public norms they embody 
45. ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012). 
46. /d. at 253. 
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clash with the norms of what Greene calls "non1ic" groups or 
communities.47 
Greene's critique of Ordered Liberty centers on his 
contention that it departs from political liberalism and embraces 
a comprehensive liberalism. He observes that we characterize 
our project as being to develop a constitutional liberalism by 
analogy to Rawls's political liberalism, as distinguished from a 
comprehensive liberalism that would promote a comprehensive 
conception of the good life. But he argues that we (as well as 
Rawls) in fact promote a comprehensive liberalism.4x A "true" 
political liberalism, he suggests, would be more "open-minded at 
a meta-level toward what may be good."4" We should distinguish 
two arguments he makes: (1) that even Rawls hin1self in fact 
goes beyond a political liberalism to a comprehensive liberalism, 
and therefore that our constitutional liberalism, to the extent it 
builds upon Rawls, goes beyond political liberalism, and (2) to 
the extent that we develop a "mild form of perfectionism" that 
would engage in a formative project to inculcate liberal virtues, 
we go beyond Rawls's political liberalism to a comprehensive 
liberalism. 
We have two responses. One, Rawls stays within political 
liberalism as he conceives it as distinguished from com-
prehensive liberalism as he conceives it. We do not mean that 
simply as a matter of definition. Rather, we mean that we do not 
interpret him as proposing imposing a comprehensive liberal 
conception of the good. Two, we did not claim to be explicating 
Rawls's own views, or to be developing his constitutional theory, 
but instead to be developing a constitutional liberalism by 
analogy to Rawls's political liberalism, and to be applying that 
Rawlsian view to topics that he himself did not address (or at 
least did not fully address). In fact, we believe that our 
constitutional liberalism is a civic liberalism that largely accords 
with Rawls's political liberalism. We are reinforced in this view 
by the fact that Stephen Macedo, who has developed a civic 
liberalism concerned to secure liberal virtues, likewise conceives 
his project as broadly speaking Rawlsian.50 
47. !d. at 55. 
4~. Greene, supra note I, at 422-30. For Greene's full argument that Rawls goes 
beyond political liberalism to a comprehensive liberalism, see Abner S. Greene, 
Uncommon Ground: A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's 
Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994). 
49. Greene, supra note I, at 433. 
50. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A 
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: 
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Greene assesses our claim to be political liberals with 
respect to "scope" and "grounds." He acknowledges that we 
seem to be political liberals with respect to scope, for example, 
we are concerned to inculcate civic virtues essential to 
responsible citizenship, not moral virtues essential to the good 
life simpliciter. And he concedes that we justify our project on 
grounds of securing the capacities for responsible citizenship. 
Still, it seems that our embrace of a "formative project" and our 
characterization of our civic liberalism as a "mild form of 
perfectionism" leads him to think that we have crossed the line 
into comprehensive liberalism. 51 
. In the end, the questio~ whether we. ~re ':true g~litical 
hberals" or whether Greene IS a truer pohtlcal liberal Is less 
important than the question whether we have put forward an 
attractive and persuasive view. We believe that what drives 
Greene's criticism is not so much a fastidious concern to be true 
to political liberalism as it is a concern to defend his own 
conception of pluralism over and against Rawls's and ours. He 
rejects our "mild form of perfectionism" and indeed our "civic 
liberalism" because of his rejection of what he calls the "'plenary 
sovereignty" of the state and because of his argument for 
"permeable sovereignty" and "the multiple sources of authority 
in a liberal democracy."53 We believe that he is wary of talk 
about government having a "fonnative project" because he sees 
that as incompatible with his vision of the state as just one of 
many sources of norms in the marketplace. In short, we think 
that the debate between Greene and us is more fruitfully framed 
as a debate between competing understandings of pluralism and 
the aspiration to e pluribus unum than as between a true political 
liberalism and a comprehensive liberalism. In his review, Greene 
appeals to a "deep and wide pluralism" or a "marriage of 
pluralism with political liberalism" that "permits groups to 
develop apart from the state." This, he says, is "the best way to 
apply an appropriate liberal sense of doubt about whether we've 
gotten the right or best answers. "54 He makes a plea for a 
constitutional "agnosticism. "55 
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM ( 1990). 
51. Greene, supra note 1, at 423-27. 
52. !d. at 433 .. 
53. GREENE, supra note 45, at 20-24. 
54. Greene, supra note 1, at 422. 
55. GREENE, supra note 45, at 23. 
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Should we be so doubtful? One could read Ordered Liberty 
as an argument "against agnosticism" with respect to the 
importance of inculcating civic virtues and public values 
notwithstanding pluralism. Further, we interpret our con-
stitutional order to support the view that government is not 
merely one among the many, but should have special weight in 
terms of the demands it makes upon us-and the responsibilities 
it has to us-as citizens. We disagree with Greene concerning 
these matters, but there is not room in this brief response to 
make the case fully. 56 
Here we shall simply note two big reservations concerning 
Greene's vision of pluralism. One, the aspiration to e pluribus 
unum is likely to implode without a more ambitious aspiration to 
unum- for example, an overlapping consensus among reason-
able conceptions of the good and a formative project to inculcate 
civic virtues in circumstances of pluralism- than he allows. Two, 
we fear that the groups to which he would grant accom-
modations and exemptions in the name of the Free Exercise 
Clause and his commitment to pluralism are not likely to accept 
the litnits he would impose upon them in the name of the 
Establishment Clause. We fear that such groups will not settle 
for what Greene calls the "political balance" of the religion 
clauses.57 Moreover, we share Rawls's concern that 
"unreasonable'' groups, instead of honoring the "duty of 
civility," will not forbear the attempt to impose their own 
comprehensive religious conceptions of the good through the 
political process.5x Greene's "balance" will prove to be too 
"reasonable" for them. 
Finally, we want to make clear that we do not in our book 
develop a full blown theory of governmental speech. Greene 
focuses, in tern1s of his title, on "state speech." And he pairs our 
book with Corey Brettschneider's recent book entitled When the 
State Speaks, What Should It Say?,w Brettschneider, like us, aims 
to elaborate a political liberalism and, unlike us, does develop a 
56. Each of us pursues our differences with Greene's approach set out in his book, 
Against Obligation, in a forthcoming issue of Boston University Law Review: James E. 
Fleming, Fit, Justification, and fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
_ (2013); Linda C. McClain, Against Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn't Just One 
(Authority) Among the Many, 93 B. U. L. REV._ (2013). 
57. GREENE, supra note 45. at 149-57. 
5X. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 58-66,217-19 (1993). 
5lJ. COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT 
SAY!: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 
(2012). 
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full blown view of governmental speech. Perhaps some of 
Greene's remarks are better directed against Brettschneider's 
theory of state speech than against our book. As suggested 
above, our discussion of the First Amendment is more about: (1) 
the tendency toward a rights absolutism in the protection of 
individual speech even among communitarians (Chapter 2), and 
(2) First Amendment clashes involving institutions of civil 
society and governmental promotion of equality, whether 
through antidiscrimination laws or marriage equality laws 
(Chapter 6). We want to observe an irony in Greene's criticism 
of our view with respect to state speech. He criticizes us (as well 
as Brettschneider) for going beyond political liberalism to 
comprehensive liberalism. Ordinarily, that would seem to imply 
that we see a larger role for the state in promoting a vision of the 
good life than would political liberals. Yet Greene argues that, 
within his own truer political liberalism, the state has a freer 
hand and a larger role in seeking to persuade people concerning 
a wide range of conceptions of the good.60 
IV. CONCLUSION: ALL THAT YOU CAN'T LEAVE 
BEHIND 
We are honored that our book has prompted such 
thoughtful engagement by Massaro, Kersch, and Greene. Their 
essays demonstrate many of the complexities of working up an 
account of the ordering of rights, responsibilities, and virtues in 
our constitutional democracy at the present time: all that you 
can't leave behind, as U2 put it. Understanding and reimagining 
ordered liberty in circumstances of deepening pluralism and 
partisanship-when it may be "even worse than it looks"h1-is an 
imperative project. The essays also raise questions for further 
research, many of which we expect to pursue in future work. 
60. Greene, supra note 1, at 428-29, 431-32. 
61. We allude to THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE 
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE 
NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012). 
